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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Appellant Russel Passons'

petition for post-conviction relief.

B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Facts relevant to underlying criminal proceedings

On June 21, 2012 Mr. Passons entered a Walmart, took a stroller without paying for it and
placed it in his car. Exhibits, p. 160-162, 177 (Ex 1, Jury Trial Transcript). Mr. Passons then reentered the store, placed a television into a shopping cart, and again exited without paying. State

v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286, 289, 346 P.3d 303, 306 (Ct. App. 2015) (Passons 1). Two loss
protection employees observed Mr. Passons exit without paying and confronted him in the
parking lot. Id. These employees claimed that Mr. Passons pulled a folding knife from his pocket
and pointed it at them running to his car and drove away, leaving the television in the shopping
cart. Id.
The following day, Mr. Passons and two acquaintances went to a different Walmart in the
area. Id. Mr. Passons and a woman entered the store and the woman attempted -

unsuccessfully

to return the stroller. Id. An employee recognized Mr. Passons as matching the description of

the person who had been at the other Walmart the day prior and called police. Id. Police
identified Mr. Passons' vehicle after he had driven away and began pursuit. Id. Mr. Passons fled,
but ultimately crashed the vehicle and was apprehended. Id. The state charged Mr. Passons with
two counts of aggravated assault (one for each employee) in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-901,
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18-905, and one count of burglary, LC.§ 18-1401. The prosecution also alleged that the use of
the knife as a sentencing enhancement pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-25 20. State v. Passons, 163
Idaho 643, 644, 417 P.3d 240, 241 (2018) (Passons 2).
The public defender was appointed to represent Mr. Passons and Mr. Passons advised
counsel that he did neither used nor displayed a knife during the alleged crime. R. 20; Exhibits p.
783 (Supp Aff Oppose Summary Dismissal). On August 30, 2012, Mr. Passons' attorney moved
to withdraw so that Mr. Passons could exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Exhibits p. 393 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). After exploring

Mr. Passons' competence and whether he knowingly waived his right to representation, the
magistrate indicated it would give Mr. Passons more time to consider his decision. Exhibits, p.
394 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). Mr. Passons advised that he did not require additional time and
the magistrate admonished that he was giving it to him anyway. Exhibits p. 394 (Clerk's Record
No. 41288).
The following day, the magistrate again inquired regarding Mr. Pas sons' desire to forego
counsel and Mr. Passons advised he wished to represent himself so that he could review
discovery, which he had not yet been allowed to review. Exhibits p. 397 (Clerk's Record No.
41288). Ultimately, the magistrate granted Mr. Passons' request, allowed the public defender to
withdraw and remain as standby counsel. Exhibits p. 397, 403 (Clerk's Record No. 41288).
On September 11, 2012, Mr. Passons requested a continuance because he had not
reviewed a video and needed more time in the law library. Exhibits p. 405 (Clerk's Record No.
41288). The magistrate denied the motion and left the preliminary hearing scheduled for the
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following day. Exhibits p. 405 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). At the time set for the preliminary
hearing, Mr. Passons again indicated he was not ready to proceed and submitted a written motion
to continue. Exhibits, p. 408-413 (Clerk's Record No. 41288); p. 793, In. 1-5 (prelim transcript).
Mr. Passons explained that the investigator with the public defender's office had
completed some investigation but was out of town. Exhibits, p. 793, In. 1-5 (Prelim Transcript
No. 41288). The magistrate noted that the public defenders were not Mr. Passons' "attorneys
anymore" and Mr. Passons indicated: "But they have pertinent information and evidence that I
need, I would like to have." Exhibits, p. 793, In. 6-11 (Prelim Transcript No. 41288). Mr. Passons
argued that he received his case file two days earlier and had insufficient opportunity to review it
and prepare for the hearing. Exhibits, p. 793, In. 14-18 (Prelim Transcript No. 41288).
The magistrate denied Mr. Passons' motion to continue, finding the "inconveniences" of
self-representation had been addressed in the previous hearing, he was advised "strongly of those
things ... understood them [and] discharged [his] attorney." Exhibits, p. 794, In. 3-9 (Prelim
Transcript No. 41288). After the preliminary hearing, Mr. Passons noted that he was provided
neither time nor materials and information necessary to prepare for the hearing and had been
"steamrolled." Exhibits, p. 819, In. 4-14 (Prelim Transcript No. 41288).
Mr. Passons was bound over to the district court. Exhibits, p. 408-418 (Clerk's Record
No. 41288). On September 18, 2012, Mr. Passons filed a motion seeking law library time and
legal supplies. Exhibits, p. 421-422 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). Mr. Passons indicated that the
one hour of access to the law library and six sheets of paper, which he was permitted, were
inadequate for him to properly prepare his case. Exhibits, p. 421-422 (Clerk's Record No.
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41288). On September 23, 2012, Mr. Psasons submitted a kite 1 indicating he needed to view a
DVD in the public defender's possession. Exhibits, p. 499 (Clerk's Record No. 41288).
On October 1, 2012, Mr. Passons submitted a kite seeking a hearing as soon as possible
on his application for funds related to his self-representation. Exhibits, p. 660 (Clerk's Record
No. 41288). On October 2, 2012, Mr. Passons applied for investigator funds to assist with trial
preparation. Exhibits, p. 434-435 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). Mr. Passons also asked for legal
publications, legal supplies, envelopes and paper, a video expert and phone use. Exhibits, p.
434-435 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). Mr. Passons requested a hearing on his motions. Exhibits,
p. 438 (Clerk's Record No. 41288)
At the arraignment, the district court did not address Mr. Pas sons' requests and
questioned his decision to represent himself. See R. 134. After approximately five minutes of
discussion, Mr. Passons stated, "you convinced me - can I get him appointed to represent me
again?" R. 134. Without further inquiry, the district court re-appointed the public defender. R.
134.
On November 7, 2012, Mr. Passons submitted a kite indicating he need to reschedule a
phone appointment because the one schedule for the previous day did not happen. Exhibits, p.
663 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). Finally, on December 18, the district court denied Mr. Passons'
motion for law library access, noting Mr. Passons was represented. Exhibits, p. 664 (Clerk's

Forms titled "Inmate Request Form - Kite" appear in the clerk's record from Mr. Passons'
direct appeal, which is an appellate exhibit. Exhibits, p. 656-664. These forms, which provide
space for the inmate to write the request and to choose from among various recipients, are
referred to herein as "kites."
1

4

Record No. 41288). On January 19, 2013, Mr. Passons submitted a kite indicating he needed the
investigator to contact witnesses. Exhibits, p. 656 (Clerk's Record No. 41288).
The case proceeding to trial and, during voir dire, the district court asked if anyone knew
of a reason why they could not be fair and impartial. A prospective juror responded: "this is kind
of embarrassing to say, but if he's a defendant, I work in a bar. He's already covered in tattoos.
He's been in and out of jail more than I can count. Those aren't normal tattoos that people just get
for decoration. I've already formed an opinion of him. I honestly don't think I can give him a fair
trial" Passons 1, 158 Idaho at 293, 346 P.3d at 310. The district court indicated he did not agreed
but appreciated the juror sharing her conclusion. Passons 1, 158 Idaho at 293, 346 P.3d at 310.
The juror interjected: "I know about the difference between decorative and -" at which point
the district court interrupted: "That's quite all right. Thank you very much... Why don't you go
ahead and step down and I will excuse you." Id. at 293, 346 P.3d at 310. Mr. Passons asked the
district court to declare a mistrial, which it denied. Id. at 293, 346 P.3d at 310.
Over Mr. Passons' objection, the district court allowed the jury to hear evidence of Mr.
Passons' flight from police the day after the alleged burglary and assaults. Passons 1, 158 Idaho
at 289, 346 P.3d at 306. During direct examination of an officer, the prosecutor asked her to
describe what was going on during the pursuit, and the officer responded: "We were following a
suspect from a robbery that occurred." Id. at 293, 346 P.3d at 310. Defense counsel objected and
the district court sustained the objection. Id. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel
again moved for a mistrial, arguing that the term robbery was inaccurate and inflammatory, that
it was misconduct for the prosecutor to solicit the testimony and that cumulative error had
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infected the fairness of his trial. Id. The district court recognized the testimony came from law
enforcement but concluded a mistrial was unnecessary and the statement did not deprive Mr.
Passons of a fair trial. Id. at 293-94, 346 P.3d at 310-11. Though acknowledging the juror
articulated what she believed the tattoos to mean, the district court concluded that the comments
were not so extreme as to warrant a mistrial. Id. The district court instructed the jury that there
was no robbery, there had been no robbery charged, and that Mr. Passons was not a suspect in a
robbery. Id.
The jury found Mr. Pas sons guilty of two counts of aggravated assualt and burglary.
Exhibits, p. 635 (Clerk's Record No. 41288).On March 8, 2013, Mr. Passons filed a document
outline difficulties with representation. p. 647-654 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). The district court
sentenced Mr. Passons to a unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of confinement
of ten years for aggravated assault enhanced by § 19-2514, concurrent unified term of five years,
all determinate, for aggravated assault, concurrent unified term of ten years with a minimum
period of confinement of five years for burglary. p. 678 (Clerk's Record No. 41288).

2.

Direct Appeal

On appeal, Mr. Passons argued the district court abused its discretion by allowing
testimony relating to his actions the day after the charged crimes, that the district court erred in
failing to grant his motions for a mistrial and that the various alleged errors at trial combined to
deprive him of his right to a fair trial. Passons 1, 158 Idaho 286, 290, 346 P.3d 303, 307. The
Court of Appeals held that returning the stroller tended to show Mr. Passons had a plan upon
entering the store to obtain an item of value and to later return it to a different store. Id.. Thus, it
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was proper for the State to introduce evidence to establish that it was part of Passons' plan to
steal items before he entered the store. Id. at 291, 346 P.3d at 308.
However, the Court of Appeals held that whether Mr. Passons fled from officers the day
after he entered Walmart to steal the television had no bearing on his intent or motive upon
entering the store the previous day. Passons 1, 158 Idaho at 291-92, 346 P.3d at 308-09. Thus,
only the testimony of returning the stroller was relevant to show a motive or intent. Id. at 292,
346 P.3d at 309. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Mr. Passons' conduct the previous day
put him at risk of prosecution for a number of crimes, and his flight from the same retail store
chain the subsequent day was admissible evidence to establish a consciousness of guilt. Id. The
Court concluded that the evidence was prejudicial to Mr. Passons but not "unfairly so" and the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence. Id. Considering the trial as a
whole, the Court held none of the statements were so prejudicial as to require reversal and
affirmed his judgment of conviction. Id.

3.

Post-Conviction Relief

On September 4, 2015, Mr. Passons initiated the instant post-conviction relief
proceedings. R. 12-15. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on March 10, 2016.
R. 16-34. Mr. Passons alleged that the court's refusal to provide him access to legal materials, an
investigator and other tools to present his defense deprived him of his right to self-representation.
R. 20-23. Mr. Passons also alleged that standby counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel

by failing to assist Mr. Pas sons in securing the video recording of the alleged assault, other
investigator information and failing to protect his right to self-representation. R. 24, 71. Mr.
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Passons also alleged that the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into his waiver of his
right to self-representation. R. 21-23. Mr. Passons alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately cross-examine the Walmart employees regarding the failure to preserve the
video and their inconsistent descriptions of the event. R. 24. Mr. Passons alleged that counsel
should have requested a spoilation instruction. R. 26. Mr. Passons also alleged his trial attorney
was ineffective by failing to object to this unconstitutional infliction of multiple punishment.
The state moved for summary dismissal. R. 55. In the underlying criminal case, on April
28, 2016, Mr. Pas sons filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35. Exhibits, p. 823-845. Mr. Passons argued that his enhanced sentence for aggravated
assault violated double jeopardy because the aggravated assault statute and the enhancement
statute both punished the same offense -

using a deadly weapon in an assault. Passons 2, 163

Idaho at 649,417 P.3d at 246 (2018).
On January 17, 201 7, the district court summarily dismissed all Mr. Passons' claims with
the exception of his claim regarding multiple punishments, which the district court entered a stay
pending the outcome of Mr. Passons' appeal from his the denial of his Rule 3 5. On March 19,
2019, Mr. Passons filed a motion to lift the stay, noting the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in

Passons 2. R.156-58. The state moved for summary dismissal of the sentence enhance claim,
alleging Passons 2 was dispositive. R. 161-166. The district court agreed, summarily dismissed
the remaining claim and entered judgment. R. 246-249. This appeal follows. R. 250.
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Passons' petition for post-

conviction relief because he alleged facts that established that he was denied a meaningful
opportunity to represent himself in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution?
2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Passons' petition for post-

conviction relief because he alleged facts that established he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
Summary dismissal is appropriate only if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven

by the underlying criminal record, the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie
case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify
relief as a matter oflaw. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010);

DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Black v. State, 165 Idaho 100,
439 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (May 17, 2019). The court must construe all
disputed facts in the petitioner's favor and may summarily dismiss when the facts so construed
fail to establish a basis for relief as a matter of law. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603, 200 P.3d at 1152;

Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). An evidentiary hearing
must be conducted when petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
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facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at
1111; Black, 165 Idaho 104,439 P.3d at 1276.

B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Passons' Petition for PostConviction Relief Because He Alleged Facts Establishing That He Was Denied A
Meaningful Opportunity to Represent Himself in Violation of the Sixth Amendment
"Faretta held, without qualification, that a defendant who makes an unequivocal and

timely request to represent himself has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and that a
denial of self-representation in the face of such a request is a violation of that right." Tamplin v.
Muniz, 894 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2018). Courts violate the right to self-representation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying a selfrepresented defendant the means of presenting a defense. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 104 7 (9th
Cir. 1989); People v. Moore, 253 P.3d 1153, 1169 (Cal. SC 2011). An incarcerated defendant may
not meaningfully exercise his right to represent himself without access to law books, witnesses,
or other tools to prepare a defense. List, 880 F.2d at 104 7.
Here, Mr. Passons alleged that his lack of access to funds for investigation or legal
materials and the magistrates refusal to continue his preliminary hearing forced him relinquish
his self-representation right. R. 21-23, 29, 71. Specifically, eleven days after the the magistrate
allowed the public defender to withdraw and remain as standby counsel- two days before the
preliminary hearing- Mr. Passons received his case file. Exhibits p. 397, 403 (Clerk's Record
No. 41288); p. 793, In. 14-18 (Prelim Transcript No. 41288). Mr. Passons sought to continue his
preliminary hearing, noting he had insufficient opportunity to review the file and prepare for the
hearing. Exhibits, p. 405, 408-413 (Clerk's Record No. 41288), p. 793, In. 1-18 (Prelim
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Transcript No. 41288). Mr. Passons also explained that the investigator with the public
defender's office had completed some investigation but was out of town and that the public
defenders had: "pertinent information and evidence" that he needed. Exhibits, p. 793, In. 1-11
(Prelim Transcript No. 41288).
In denying Mr. Pas sons' motion to continue, the magistrate ruled that Mr. Pas sons' lack of
access to his file and the investigator's findings were part of the "inconveniences" of selfrepresentation." Exhibits, p. 794, In. 3-9 (Prelim Transcript No. 41288). After Mr. Passons was
bound over to the district court, he filed a motions and kites seeking time in the law library, legal
supplies such as paper, telephone access and an investigator. more than one hour of law library
time and legal supplies, including more than the six sheets of paper a week he was then alloted.
R. 20-22; Exhibits, p. 421-422, p. 434-435, p. 660 (Clerk's Record No. 41288).
Two weeks later, at Mr. Passons' arraignment, the district court failed to address Mr.
Passons' requests for the means to meaningfully represent himself, the district court Exhibits, p.
456-58 (Clerk's Record No. 41288). Instead, the district court dissuaded Mr. Passons from
continuing with self-representation and appointed the public defender without inquiring whether
Mr. Passons' waiver of his right to represent himself was knowing and voluntary. R. 134.
The facts of this case stand in contrast to those in People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461 (2002)
where the California Supreme Court found that the alleged inadequacy of the law library and the
sufficiency of the ancillary services did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to
meaningful access to the courts or his Sixth Amendment right as a self-represented defendant to
an opportunity to prepare his defense. Lawley, 38 P.3d at 492. Significantly, whenever the
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defendant voiced complaints about his lack of access to the jail law library, the means to review
tape recordings of interviews with prosecution witnesses, or access to witnesses, the trial court
made an effort to address his concerns. Lawley, 38 P.3d at 493. The court offered defendant the
opportunity to interview witnesses in the jury room between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. each day, orderd
an investigator report directly to the defendant, ordered the jail not to record phone calls with
witnesses and observed that witnesses could be compelled by subpoena to appear at the jail for
interviews. Lawley, 38 P.3d at 493.
As an incarcerated defendant, Mr. Passons could not meaningfully exercise his right to
represent himself without access to law books, witnesses, or other tools to prepare a defense. See
also List, 880 F.2d at 1047. However, rather than provide Mr. Passons with time and basic

resources to exercise his right self-representation, the magistrate admonished the lack of tools
were an inconvenience that accompanied the loss of counsel. The district court also did not
address Mr. Passons requests for basic resources and an investigator, leading Mr. Passons to
relinquish his self-representation.
Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding there was no issue of fact as to whether
the court deprived Mr. Passons of his right to self-represent. Moreover, a Sixth Amendment
violation is complete at the time a court erroneously denies self-representation Tamplin, 894 F.3d
at 1085. An unwanted attorney "represents" the defendant only through a tenuous and
unacceptable legal fiction as the defense presented is neither his defense nor the defense
guaranteed him by the Constitution. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821. Thus, Mr. Passons was not
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required to demonstrate any prejudice and the court's deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
exercise his right to self-representation require that his judgement of conviction be vacated.
Nor did Mr. Passons properly waive his right to self-representation. A defendant's waiver
of his right to counsel's remains valid and in effect throughout a criminal proceeding unless
intervening events substantially change the circumstances existing at the time of the initial
colloquy. United States v. Audette, 923 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hantzis,
625 F.3d 575, 580-81 (9th Cir. 2010). A defendant must expressly request appointment of
counsel for later proceedings or suggest that his waiver was limited to a particular stage of the
proceedings for his initial waiver to lapse. Audette, 923 F.3d qt 1236; Hantzis, 625 F.3d at 581.
Here, the district court had no reason to question Mr. Passons' choice to represent himself
as no intervening event placed the initial waiver into question. Moreover, the trial court failed to
inquire into the reasons for Mr. Passons' change of heart or whether he was knowingly and
intelligently relinquishing his self-representation right. R. 74-7 5.
The trial court deprived Mr. Passons of the means necessary to represent himself and then
convinced him to relinquish his right to self-representation without conducting a proper inquiry.
Mr. Passons established an issue of fact as to whether his right to self-representation was violated
and this Court should vacate the judgment dismissing his post-conviction relief petition and
remand for an evidentiary hearing.

13

C.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Passons' Petition for PostConviction Relief Because He Alleged Facts Establishing That He Received
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee criminal defendants

the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984); Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014). Ineffective assistance of
counsel claims require the post-conviction petition to prove: (1) the attorney performed
deficiently and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88;

Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 717, 390 P.3d 439,443 (2017).
A post-conviction petitioner establishes his attorney's performance was deficient by
proving his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443. Counsel's strategic
and tactical decisions can justify relief when the petitioner shows the decisions resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review. Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717,390 P.3d at 443; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570,225
P.3d 700, 703 (2010). Ultimately, "the standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at
443; State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). Under the second prong,
the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would be different but
for counsel's deficient performance. McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694; McKay, 148 Idaho at 570,225 P.3d at 703.
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1.

Standby counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to assist Mr.
Passons preserve the Walmart surveillance footage

Although a self-represented defendant has no constitutional right to the appointment of
advisory counsel, when such counsel is appointed, the defendant is entitled to expect
professionally competent assistance within the narrow scope of advisory counsel's proper

Lawley, 3 8 P.3d at 491-92. The district court held that the duties of standby counsel are limited
to appearing with a defendant "during proceedings in the event counsel needs to step-in." R.
129-130. Because the district court found that standby counsel's duties did not include assisting
Mr. Passons in obtaining the video surveillance before it was destroyed, it concluded that Mr.
Passons did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel of standby counsel. Id.
However, during the preliminary hearing, the Walmart asset protection employee testified
that the security camera stored 90 days worth of video, which meant that unrecorded video of the
day in question would expire six days after the preliminary hearing. Exhibits, p. 803, In. 10-11.
Mr. Passons asked standby counsel, who was present at the hearing, to assist in obtaining the
surveillance video. Under these circumstances, it fell squarely within standby counsel's duties to
assist Mr. Passons in preparing a preservation request and subpoena, which would have
prevented Walmart from allowing the video to be destroyed.
Moreover, Mr. Passons obtained new recordings from Walmart, which were taken at the
same date and time as the day in question, four years later. Exhibits 8a through 8d, and 21. This
camera view would have shown that Mr. Passons did not have a knife and instead wielded car
keys. Because standby counsel failed to provide effective assistance, this crucial piece of
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evidence-the video was destroyed. Accordingly, Mr. Passons presented an issue of material fact
as to whether he receive ineffective assistance of counsel of standby counsel.

2.

Counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to protect Mr. Passons'
right to self-representation

As noted above, the district court failed to adequately determine whether Mr. Passons'
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to self-representation. Newly appointed counsel
should have raised the issue of a proper revocation of a Faretta based self-representation.
Counsel's conduct, in addition to the district court's, violated Mr. Passons's right to selfrepresentation. See also R. 71. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr.
Passons' petition for post-conviction relief.

3.

Counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to failing to object to
testimony of the knife, failing to effectively cross examine the employees and
failing to request a spoilation instruction

At trial, counsel failed to elicit testimony establishing that the Walmart employees failed
to preserve the video recording of the confrontation in the parking lot. R. 21, 62, 80. Counsel
similarly failed to effectively cross examine the Walmart employees regarding their conflicting
descriptions of the alleged knife, whether the video recording was truly whited out and the
employees' motive for recording inculpatory clips from the surveillance but allowing the only
objective evidence of the alleged assault to be destroyed. Because counsel failed to effectively
cross-examine the witnesses, the state was able to argue in closing that "there is nothing to
impeach either of those two employees about what they saw." R. 63. Because counsel failed to
introduce evidence regarding Walmart's failure to preserve the video, counsel did not request an
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instruction telling the jury that the lack of a DVD of the critical, decisive interaction allows an
inference that the evidence was favorable to Mr. Passons. R. 63, 82. Similarly, trial counsel did
not request an instruction that advised the jury could infer the destroyed evidence would have
been helpful to Mr. Passons.
Mr. Pas sons presented an issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to effectively cross examine and otherwise challenge the Walmart
employees motives for destroying the video recording of the alleged assault. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse and remand.

4.

Counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to locate and call a witness
to testify that Mr. Passons had money to negate intent to commit theft

Mr. Passons' daughter, Rachel Pas sons would testified that Mr. Passons had access to
funds and did not need to steal the items. R. 24. Had she been called, the jury would have
acquitted the burglary charge and found Mr. Pas sons guilty of theft. would have been found to be
a theft and there would have been no assault conviction. Mr. Passons presented an issue of
material fact as to whether trial counsel was ineffective for to call Ms. Passons as a witness.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand.

5.

Violation of right to conflict free counsel

The attorney's duty ofloyalty is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 692. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
the assistance of conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v.
Carver, 155 Idaho 489, 491, 314 P.3d 171, 173 (2013). Once alerted to a potential conflict, the
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Sixth Amendment requires the trial court to conduct a thorough and searching examination of the
potential conflict, which should be conducted on the record. Carver, 155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d
at 174; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414, 424 (2009). The trial court must first
determine whether a conflict actually exists, necessarily relying on defense counsel's good faith
and good judgment. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980); Severson, 147 Idaho at
704, 215 P.3d at 424. Next, if the trial court finds that defense counsel is burdened with a conflict
of interest, it must obtain the defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver or give the defendant an
opportunity to acquire new counsel. Id. If the court concludes that a conflict of interest does not
exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. Id.
Here, counsel objected to Mr. Passons' requests for assistance, resisted his efforts to
gather and present a defensible case, and did not investigate or pursue funds for a proper
investigation. R. 25. Counsel's disagreements with Mr. Passons' reasonable requests for defense
preparation showed the existence of a conflict and a defect in representation. R. 25. The various
letters and "kites" show counsel's conduct created an environment where his efforts at selfrepresentation were thwarted by conflicts and non-action by standby counsel. R. 78.
These facts give rise to an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Pas sons' right to conflict-free
counsel was violated. The district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition and this Court
should reverse and remand.
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6.

Cumulative error

The cumulative effect deficient performance by defense counsel and other errors can
warrant where those errors, individually, are not serious enough to warrant reversal.
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 421, 327 P.3d 372, 397 (Ct. App. 2013). Here, on direct appeal,
the Court of Appeals found neither the prospective juror's remarks, the officer's inflammatory
mention of a "robbery" or the improper use of flight evidence as egregious enough to deprive
Mr. Passons of his right to a fair trial. However, when the effect of these issues are viewed
cumulatively with the violation of Mr. Passons' right to self-representation and his attorney's
deficient performance, they establish that Mr. Passons did not receive the fair trial guaranteed by
the constitution. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Passons'
petition for post-conviction relief.
IV. CONCLUSION

Mr. Passons presented issues of material fact as to whether his right to self-representation
and to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment were violated. Accordingly,
the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and this
Court should reverse the district court's judgment and remand with instruction to grant an
evidentiary hearing.
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